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POLICY CHALLENGE
Blue Bonds:EU countries should pool up to 60 percent of GDP of their na-
tional debt under joint and several liability as senior sovereign debt, there-
by reducing the borrowing cost for that part of the debt. Red debt:any na-
tional debt beyond a country’s Blue Bond allocation should be issued as
national and junior debt with sound procedures for an orderly default, thus
increasing the marginal
cost of public borrowing
and helping to enhance
fiscal discipline.
Independent Stability
Council (ISC):Blue Bond al-
locations to member states
are to be proposed by an
ISC and voted on by
member states parlia-
ments in order to safe-
guard fiscal responsibility. 
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SUMMARYHow can the euro area’s return to fiscal sustainability be organ-
ised in view of soaring debt levels and the sovereign debt crisis? How can
we finance our debts efficiently, not least to prevent debt crises in weaker
countries where high debt levels compounded by a hike in risk premiums
on government bonds can create a debt trap? This looks like a classic dilem-
ma. European solidarity with the most vulnerable European Union countries
runs the risk of further weakening the incentives for individual countries to
pursue fiscally sustainable policies. While not a quick fix, our Blue Bond pro-
posal charts an incentive-driven and durable way out of this dilemma while
helping prepare the ground for the rise of the euro as an important reserve
currency, which could reduce borrowing costs for everybody involved.
Source: DG ECFIN, authors. EA = euro area.b
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THE BLUE BOND PROPOSAL
THE SOVEREIGN BOND CRISISin the
euro area calls for both lower and
higher sovereign bond yields.
Lower yields are desirable because
they would reduce the cost of fi-
nancing government debt for
European taxpayers. This is partic-
ularly relevant in the years ahead,
when the financing of the accumu-
lated debt will remain a serious
burden even once deficits have
come back to sustainable levels.
And higher bond yields are desir-
able as an early warning signal to
those countries on an unsustain-
able fiscal path. If financial mar-
kets are failing Greece now, they
failed Greece even more before the
crisis by continuing to provide
cheap funding while fiscal policy
was reckless. 
Achieving both higher and lower
yields at the same time would
appear to be impossible. Yet, in
this paper we argue that our Blue
Bond proposal can do just that.
Before explaining what it is, let us
first explore how the two objec-
tives might be pursued separately. 
The cost of borrowing could be low-
ered significantly by pooling gov-
ernment debt within the euro area,
creating a euro bond. The yield of
that euro bond would likely be
lower than the weighted average of
the national bond yields. The euro
bond would become a highly liquid
asset with a volume of available
debt rivaling the extremely suc-
cessful US Treasury bond. This
would help the euro’s rise as a
second global reserve currency. 
Conversely, the cost of borrowing
should be increased for a country
on a reckless borrowing path by
disentangling sovereign debt re-
sponsibilities within the euro area
to the extent that the no-bailout
clause becomes credible not only
de jure (which it is) but also de
facto, which presently is not the
case as recent events show.
Currently, euro-area members
have collectively
come to agree that
the political and eco-
nomic cost of not at
least attempting to
bail out Greece is so
enormous that it
would be irresponsi-
ble not to try. The
reason is that in the
present setting any sovereign de-
fault is likely to have systemic
consequences. To avoid these, it
needs to be credibly established
that sovereign bankruptcy for
members of the euro area is some-
thing that has been properly
planned for rather than something
that threatens the very existence
of the euro area. Such advance
planning needs to concern the
bankruptcy procedure itself and
needs to reduce the vulnerability
of the European banking system to
a sovereign-debt crisis. Also, the
risk of contagion within the euro
area needs to be brought under
better control. 
In a nutshell: cheaper borrowing
requires more integration whereas
more expensive borrowing re-
quires measures to avoid sys-
temic consequences. On that
basis, we now try to pursue both
objectives at the same time by
pooling one part of the debt while
ringfencing another part.
Specifically, we propose that eligi-
ble EU governments should pool up
to 60 percent of GDP of their gov-
ernment debt in the form of a
common European government
bond, which we call the Blue Bond.
Any public debt in excess of their
Blue Bond allocation
national govern-
ments would have to
issue in junior na-
tional debt, which we
will call the red debt
in the remainder of
this paper. 
Section 1 outlines
the basic economics of the propos-
al. In section 2, the impact of
greater liquidity in the Blue Bond
on borrowing cost is discussed. In
the section 3, suitable institutional
underpinnings of our proposal are
explored and a transition regime is
proposed.  Finally, in section 4, the
likely implications of our proposal
for different types of participating
countries are explored.
1 THE BASIC ECONOMICS OF THE
BLUE BOND
A country's total borrowing costs
can be calculated as the product of
the stock of outstanding debt
times the average interest rate to
be paid on that debt stock, as
Figure 1 on the next page shows.
We propose that this essentially
homogenous government debt
should be broken down into two
tranches: a senior (‘blue’) tranche
‘It needs to be credibly
established that
sovereign bankruptcy
for euro-area mem-
bers is something
that has been proper-
ly planned for.’Debt level
Interest rate
Senior status
Liquidity
Joint and several liability
Risk of
orderly default
Illiquidity
Junior status
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up to a certain debt threshold
which is assumed to be 60 percent
of GDP in the following; and a junior
(‘red’) tranche for any additional
debt above that threshold. In case
of a partial default, the red tranche
will be hit first and the blue
tranche will only be affected by
that part of the default (if any)
that is not absorbed by the junior
tranche. In other words, any gov-
ernment funds used to service and
repay government debt will
always first be used to satisfy the
claims of the Blue Bond holders.
As a result, the blue tranche will
become less risky than the status
quo debt, and the red tranche will
be more risky, leading to a differ-
entiation in interest rates, as
Figure 2 shows.
This rate differentiation is rein-
forced by liquidity effects. Under
our proposal, all the countries par-
ticipating in the Blue Bond would
pool and merge their blue tranch-
es, creating a government bond
market similar in size, liquidity
and quality to the US Treasury debt
market. Due to this gain in liquidi-
ty, the cost of borrowing would be
further reduced on the blue
tranche. By contrast, the liquidity
of the red tranche would be sub-
stantially less than the liquidity of
homogeneous national bonds cur-
rently. This reduced liquidity
should further increase borrowing
costs on the red debt.
There are additional risk consider-
ations that should be borne in
mind. For the blue debt we propose
joint and several liability to ensure
that a triple A asset is created.
From an investor's perspective,
joint and several liability will
reduce the risk of the asset further
because default risks tend not to
be perfectly correlated. Therefore,
the blue debt cost of borrowing in
the average euro-area country
should be lower still. 
By contrast, defaulting on the
entire red tranche would be less
disruptive, because in this eventu-
ality, the borrowing capacity in the
senior tranche would not be de-
stroyed. From an investor's per-
spective, the prospect of a less-
disruptive default on the junior
tranche increases the risk of de-
fault, thereby calling for an addi-
tional risk premium (see eg
Jochimsen and Konrad, 2006).
To ensure the credible prospect of
an orderly default on the red debt,
the preparations for such an even-
tuality need to be thought of as an
integral part of euro-area proce-
dures. Tightened European super-
vision of banks and rating agen-
cies would need to ensure that the
financial sector does not become
vulnerable to a default on the red
debt by fiscally less-robust
Source for both figures: Bruegel.
Interest rate
Cost of borrowing
(status quo)
Debt level
Figure 1: Borrowing cost in the status quo
Figure 2: Key factors that influence the cost of borrowing in the
senior (blue) and junior (red) trancheFigure 2, which assumes un-
changed borrowing levels.
Ultimately, this disciplining effect
of the higher marginal cost of bor-
rowing is the most important dis-
tinction between our Blue Bond
proposal and the first generation
of proposals to pool the debt of EU
countries in a euro bond (see eg
Bonnevay, 2010, Leterme, 2010,
or the concerns voiced by Issing
2009). Together with the liquidity
effect of the senior tranche, it is
the fiscal-discipline effect of the
junior tranche that would ensure
that the average cost of borrowing
would decrease compared to the
current situation.
Clearly, the proportions of blue and
red debt would vary substantially
from country to country as illus-
trated by Figure 4, and so will the
nature of the benefits implied by
the proposed scheme, as  dis-
cussed in the closing section.
2 THE IMPACT OF LIQUIDITY ON
BORROWING COSTS
The euro-area Blue Bond market
could amount to 60 percent of
euro-area GDP (about €5,600 bil-
lion), which is about five times the
current market for the German
Bund and  almost as large as the
US Treasury debt market (about
$8,300 billion).
Other things being equal, greater
liquidity in a bond reduces the bor-
rowing costs (see Amihud et al,
2005, for the various measures of
liquidity). Large public institution-
al investors (central banks and
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Interest rate
Debt level
Fiscal
discipline
Fiscal
discipl.
Figure 3: Improved fiscal discipline due to the increased
marginal cost of debt
Source: Bruegel.
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Figure 4: Split of 2011 forecast debt levels into red/blue debt
Source: DG ECFIN, Bruegel. Forecast levels of debt as % of GDP.
member states. Among others, the
European Central Bank (ECB)
should take a prudent stand re-
garding the eligibility of red bonds
for its repo facility.  Furthermore, in
order to qualify for pooled borrow-
ing via the Blue Bond, national gov-
ernments should be obliged to in-
troduce a standardised collective-
action clause for their red bond
borrowing, which would make any
debt restructuring a less messy
and lengthy undertaking.
Finally, we need to add to the pic-
ture a key aspect that we have
neglected so far: the likely impact
of our proposal on overall debt.
Generally, one would expect fiscal
discipline to improve as a result of
the increased cost of public-sector
borrowing at the margin (Figure
3). Improved fiscal discipline
would not only bring down overall
debt, but would also reduce the
cost of borrowing on the red
tranche substantially compared tosovereign wealth funds) greatly
value liquidity. For instance, many
Asian central banks buy almost
only German Bunds and French
government debt, because they
are required to invest only in par-
ticularly safe and liquid fixed-
income assets.
In practice it can be difficult to
separate yield differences on ac-
count of liquidity, from yield differ-
ences on account of risk. To illus-
trate the problem, it is instructive
to look at the recent surge in
sovereign-bond spreads in the
euro area (Figure 5). This increase
is partly due to a flight to liquidity
and partly due to a flight to safety,
with investors prepared to pay
more for a given level of liquidity or
safety. But, in addition, the crisis
has also changed objective levels
of liquidity and the risk of default
for assets. Disentangling these
four reasons for changing yields is
anything but straightforward.
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1. This 30 basis-point
premium is derived from
the swaps spreads  (ie
the difference between
swaps rates and gov-
ernment bond rates at
10-year maturity).
Before 2007, the swaps
spread was larger in the
US than in Germany by
30 basis points on aver-
age. Assuming that the
underlying risk (ie the
banking sector) in
swaps is about the
same in Germany and in
the US, we can use this
30 basis-point differen-
tial as a proxy for the
liquidity premium of the
US government bond
market, due to the US
dollar’s status as re-
serve currency.
THE BLUE BOND PROPOSAL
Finally, the dynamics of a self-ful-
filling prophecy could be at work,
with weaker countries suffering
from expanding spreads, which
can in turn further weaken their
fiscal outlook.
By creating a liquid
asset such as the
Blue Bond, one could
hope to reap a moder-
ate liquidity premium
in normal times and a
much more substan-
tial liquidity premium in times of
crisis. This increased liquidity pre-
mium for the Blue Bond in times of
crisis is of particular interest be-
cause it would increase the re-
silience in a  crisis of government
borrowing, not least of smaller and
weaker economies.
Furthermore, the introduction of a
Blue Bond with liquidity on a par
with US Treasury bonds could help
to promote the more widespread
use of the euro as a reserve
currency. Increased demand for
Blue Bonds by central banks and
sovereign wealth funds, not least
in China and other Asian countries,
would increase the liquidity gains
further. The reserve-currency
effect could be significant:
Gourinchas and Rey (2007) esti-
mate that, thanks to its reserve
currency status, the US has been
able to borrow at reduced rates for
the last 50 years by providing in-
ternational investors, including
central banks, with a large, safe
and ultra-liquid pool of debt. 
For a back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tion, let us cautiously assume a
30 basis-point liquidity premium
1
over the average of participating
countries, and also averaging
across times of calm and times of
crisis in financial markets.
With the long-run av-
erage real interest
rate of government
bonds in the euro area
at around 300 basis
points, a 30 basis-
point reduction of bor-
rowing costs would
reduce the interest burden by an
average of 10 percent at any point
in time. It turns out that this is
equivalent to reducing the net
present value of the debt stock by
10 percent also. Thus, assuming a
legacy debt stock of 60 percent of
GDP, the liquidity advantage gener-
ated could amount to an average
net present value of six percent of
the GDP of participating countries.
While this number is of course sub-
ject to considerable uncertainty, it
0
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Figure 5: Sovereign bond spreads over the German Bund in the euro
area (January 2008 to April 2010)
Source: Thomson Datastream, Eurostat.
‘A Blue Bond with
liquidity on a par
with US treasuries
could help to pro-
mote the euro as a
reserve currency.’illustrates the non-negligible scale
of the liquidity gain that one could
hope to generate. It is worth noting
that, by the same token, it may be
possible for individual member
states to reap additional savings
by pooling borrowing that is
presently fragmented between
various state agencies, regional
and local governments. In the
spirit of our proposal, this could
even be achieved without substan-
tially reducing the autonomy of
these different state actors.
3 INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP
Returning to the European level, it
is of course not enough to find that
a substantial economic gain could
be reaped by pooling liquidity. In
order to realise the gain, its distri-
bution between member states
would have to be calibrated appro-
priately to ensure that the coun-
tries involved feel it is in their best
interests to participate. One possi-
bility would be to introduce differ-
entiated membership fees for
countries issuing Blue Bonds, with
fiscally stronger countries paying
lower fees than fiscally weaker
countries, as proposed by De
Grauwe and Moesen (2009).
However, such pricing would to
some extent be arbitrary since the
different national yields for red
debt will only ever be a rather im-
perfect proxy for the risk of default
on the senior debt. Also, as a gener-
al rule, it is politically difficult in the
EU to organise explicit redistribu-
tion from weaker to stronger coun-
tries, even if the total effect, taking
the lower debt-refinancing costs
into account, would also remain
positive for weaker countries.
Instead, we favour an approach
that uses the Blue Bond rent as a
carrot to incentivise countries with
high debt levels to become more
disciplined fiscally in the after-
math of the crisis. This would be in
the interest of the weaker coun-
tries themselves, but could also
provide substantial benefits to
stronger countries, because it
would help to re-establish the
credibility of the Stability and
Growth Pact and would reduce the
risk that a bail-out of weaker coun-
tries might become necessary.
To strengthen fiscal discipline, we
propose a differentiated allocation
of Blue Bond borrowing quotas by
country. Those countries with
credible fiscal policies should be
allowed to borrow up to the full 60
percent of GDP, while countries
with a weaker fiscal position would
only be able to borrow a lower pro-
portion of GDP in Blue Bonds. In the
extreme, if a partici-
pating country was
consistently to
pursue unsustain-
able fiscal policies,
this mechanism
would even allow for
a gradual eviction
from the scheme by means of an
ever-shrinking Blue Bond
allocation.
When borrowing in red debt be-
comes expensive for a country, the
temptation to find cheaper ways of
borrowing on the side can become
very strong. Typically, this would
involve some form of financial
engineering to borrow against spe-
cific future revenues. To prevent
the emergence of such ‘black
debt’, all countries participating in
the Blue Bond scheme would need
to enter an agreement voiding any
special collateral offered for black
debt, thereby automatically con-
verting it into red debt.
But would the Blue Bond scheme
be compatible with the no-bailout
clause in Article 125 of the EU
Treaty? In economic substance,
we argue that it would, because
the joint and several guarantee
would at most apply to senior debt
amounting (up) to 60 percent of
GDP, which is a debt level deemed
sustainable for any EU member
state according to the Maastricht
Treaty. Therefore, the guarantee
would not apply to debt crises
caused by unsustainable fiscal
policies leading to excessively
high debt levels. To the extent that
situations where debt-to-GDP
ratios of less than 60 percent are
only unsustainable
in exceptional situa-
tions (article 100 of
the Treaty), such as
natural disasters
where a bailout
would be allowed, a
legal conflict would
not arise. This differentiates the
Blue Bond from more radical pro-
posals to pool the entirety of the
EU’s public debt, in which case
changes to the spirit if not the
letter of the treaty would appear
unavoidable. 
Next, the question arises of who
should be in charge of the
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THE BLUE BOND PROPOSAL
‘The Blue Bond would
reduce the risk that
bail-outs of weaker
countries might
become necessary.’allocation of Blue Bonds? Since
each Blue Bond implies a guaran-
tee by all the participating nations
and their taxpayers, the ultimate
decision on the allocation of Blue
Bonds and their corresponding
guarantees will have to be taken
by the national parliaments of all
the participating countries.
So that there will be
an orderly and
stable process for
preparing these
parliamentary de-
cisions, we propose
that participating
countries establish
an Independent
Stability Council
(ISC) with the responsibility annu-
ally to propose an allocation for
the Blue Bond, in effect amounting
to a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The
fiscal credibility of this council
would be key to establishing the fi-
nancial markets' trust in the Blue
Bond, as the historical experience
of the Australian Loan Council sug-
gests. In order to be admitted to
the Blue Bond scheme, countries
would have to convince the ISC
that their fiscal policy is credible
enough to be insured (via the joint
and several liability) by the most
credible countries of the euro area.
For example, one could imagine
that a country would not be al-
lowed into the Blue Bond pool if it
did not  have a binding fiscal rule,
analogous to the one inserted by
Germany into its constitution.  
The Stability Council would be sup-
ported by a secretariat with the
necessary economic and fiscal
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THE BLUE BOND PROPOSAL
expertise. Once the council has
made a proposal, it would be voted
on by the national parliaments of
all participating countries. Failure
to adopt the proposal would simply
lead to a leave of absence of the
country in question from the Blue
Bond scheme, during which no
new Blue Bonds could be issued
and no new guarantees for the
Blue Bonds of
other countries
would be provided.
A leave of absence
over several years
would thereby lead
to a gradual exit
from the scheme.
However, since the
decision of any
major participating country to
ease itself out could undermine
confidence in the entire scheme,
the ISC would have a strong incen-
tive to err on the side of caution,
thereby safeguarding the interests
of the European taxpayer.
An inevitably delicate question is
how to best handle the transition
to the Blue Bond scheme. We
favour an approach where all the
legacy government debt (ie issued
before the beginning of the Blue
Bond scheme) is treated as senior
to the red debt but junior (one way
or the other) to the blue debt. This
legacy debt would then be gradual-
ly replaced by the senior blue debt
and the junior red debt as the ex-
isting debt stock is rolled over. For
each country, the annual Blue
Bond allocation would determine
which proportion of the debt could
be issued as Blue Bonds and
which would have to be issued as
more costly red debt. Since most
countries commonly issue bonds
with maturities of 10 years but
usually not more, the transition
should in effect be completed after
a decade.
However, other more generous and
more rapid transition scenarios
are conceivable, for example as
part of a debt restructuring
process that may become neces-
sary during the current sovereign
debt crisis.
4 COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES
Even if our proposal achieves over-
all welfare gains, it is not a priori
obvious if different countries
would have an incentive to partici-
pate in this voluntary scheme.
Therefore, we need to explore why
different groups of countries could
indeed benefit from the scheme.
There are three important benefits.
First, smaller countries with rela-
tively illiquid sovereign bonds
stand to benefit more from the
extra liquidity of the Blue Bond
than larger countries. For example,
Austria and Luxembourg would
benefit more than France and
Germany although even for
Germany borrowing costs under
the Blue Bond scheme might fall
below current levels. 
Second, countries with high debt-
to-GDP ratios would have the
strongest incentive for fiscal ad-
justment. For example, Greece and
Portugal would have to undertake
a greater effort than, say, Finland
or the Netherlands to bring down
‘Participating countries
should establish an
Independent Stability
Council to propose an-
nually an allocation for
the Blue Bond, in effect a
take-it-or-leave-it offer.’b
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borrowing costs in red debt
through a strengthened commit-
ment to fiscal discipline that is
credible to market participants.
We would expect that many coun-
tries with high debt levels may in
fact welcome this opportunity to
commit to stronger fiscal disci-
pline after the present crisis. But
some may not. 
Third, countries that worry most
about having to foot the bill for a
sovereign bailout in the present
crisis or in future crises stand to
benefit most from the strength-
ened discipline of the Blue Bond
scheme. However, this last obser-
vation crucially depends on the
quality of the Blue Bond’s institu-
tional set-up.
Overall, we are optimistic that it
would be in the self-interest of a
sufficient number of countries to
participate in the proposed
scheme, on the basis that institu-
tional safeguards are robust.
Should the scheme go ahead, even
countries that are hesitant about
the additional fiscal discipline that
participation in the scheme would
entail may ultimately find it diffi-
cult to stay outside for the simple
reason that markets could per-
ceive a decision not to participate
as a bad signal.
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